MiniCA: A web-based certificate authority by Macdonell, James Patrick
California State University, San Bernardino 
CSUSB ScholarWorks 
Theses Digitization Project John M. Pfau Library 
2007 
MiniCA: A web-based certificate authority 
James Patrick Macdonell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project 
 Part of the Information Security Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Macdonell, James Patrick, "MiniCA: A web-based certificate authority" (2007). Theses Digitization Project. 
3256. 
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/3256 
This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
























Chair, Computer Science Date
ormation Security
ABSTRACT
The MiniCA project is proposed and developed to 
address growing demand for inexpensive access to security 
features such as privacy, strong authentication, and 
digital signatures. These features are integral to public­
key encryption technologies. Digital certificates are vital 
in improving access to and use of new security
I
technologies. Granting and revocation of digital 
certificates is overseen by a certificate authority whose 
procedures and policies are enforced through a software 
interface. MiniCA is designed to be a user friendly 
certificate authority interface. Since the certificate 
authority lays a foundation for a public-key 
infrastructure, MiniCA promotes the adoption and growth of 
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Digital certificates are a necessary, but sometimes 
expensive, commodity essential for the way sensitive 
transactions such as on-line banking can take place over 
the Internet today. Digital certificates will also be 
essential for the security of sensitive files and databases 
in the future.
A Certificate Authority (CA) is used to issue digital 
certificates in much the same way the Department of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV) issues drivers license as identification 
cards. If a person applying for a drivers license meets 
all the criteria and follows all the procedures set forth 
by the DMV, the DMV will issue that person a drivers 
license. Similarly, if an entity applying for a digital 
certificate meets all the criteria and follows all the 
procedures set forth by a CA, the CA will issue that entity 
a digital certificate. Both drivers licenses and digital 
certificates are official documents. Both are also 
certificates.
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A certificate is an official document issued by an 
authority to associate two (or more) independent pieces of 
information. For example, a diploma is issued by an 
authority, such as a high school or University, and is used 
to associate a student's name with a level of education. A 
drivers license is another example of a certificate. A 
drivers license is issued by an authority, the Department 
of Motor Vehicles, and is used to associate a photograph 
with a name and address. Digital certificates are no 
different; they are issued by a Certificate Authority to 
associate a special number called a public key with an 
identity, such as the name of a person, the name of a 
computer, or an email address.
For all certificates, the document is trustworthy only 
if both the issuing authority is trustworthy and the 
document is difficult to forge. A diploma can be trusted 
to a certain degree, provided it was issued by a credible 
high school or University. However, even if the diploma 
appears to be issued by trusted authority, the document can 
be forged and additional certificates such as embossed 
transcripts are necessary to trust that the name on the 
diploma actually has the stated level of education. A 
drivers license can be trusted to a higher degree than a 
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diploma. When the DMV, a trustworthy agency of the 
government, associates a photograph with a name and 
address, it includes an easy-to-recognize but hard-to- 
duplicate marking such as hologram in order to make its 
certificate, the drivers license, difficult to forge. 
Similarly, when a CA associates a private key with an 
identity, it includes an easy-to-recognize but hard-to- 
duplicate "marking" called a digital signature. If the 
Certificate Authority is operated by a trustworthy agency, 
then the certificates it issues can be trusted to a high 
degree, just like a drivers license.
Trustworthy certificates can be expensive to obtain. 
For example, VeriSign ®, a trustworthy Certificate 
Authority, may charge upwards to $850 per year for a 
digital certificate. However, a certificate is required 
for successful deployment of public-key encryption 
technologies such as secure web sites, which protect the 
privacy and integrity of data being passed between a web 
site and a client over the Internet. Despite the benefits, 
.public-key encryption technologies are deployed sparingly 
or reluctantly because of high cost.
3
1.2 MiniCA Overview
MiniCA project aims to encourages the deployment of 
public-key encryption technologies and the security 
features they provide by reducing the cost and complication 
of issuing trustworthy certificates. Costs will be reduced 
as MiniCA will be offered to the public as a free, open 
source software package. This will allow institutions to 
create digital certificates as needed. To ease 
complication, MiniCA will provide an easy-to-install, user 
friendly web-based interface.
In comparison to certificate authority software 
products provided by Microsoft® and the OpenCA project, 
MiniCA possesses some unique features.
1.2.1 Open Source
Unlike Microsoft's certificate authority software, 
MiniCA will be released as open-source software. This 
means that institutions which use MiniCA will be able to 
modify and contribute to the functionally of the software 
as they see fit.
1.2.2 Nested Certificates
In contrast to OpenCA, MiniCA expressly supports 
nested certificates. Nesting certificates is a practice of 
using a CA to issue an identity to a subsidiary CA, which 
4
in turn is used to either issue an identity to a subsidiary 
of the subsidiary or to issue the actual desired digital 
certificates. For example a certificate authority with the 
identity "Tier-One" may issue a certificate to a subsidiary 
certificate authority with the identity "Tier-Two", which 
in turn may issues certificates to be used for secure web 
sites.
Nesting certificates mitigates the risk posed by an 
attacker being able to forge digital certificates. Should 
an attacker compromise a subsidiary certificate authority, 
an uncompromised, superseding CA would revoke the digital 
certificate of the compromised CA. Thereafter, clients 
authenticating certificates issued from the compromised CA 
will see a break in the chain of trust. This practice also 
protects the private key of the highest superseding or 
"root" certificate from exposure. When using nested 
certificates, this key is only needed two situations: 
during the initial deployment of the certificate authority 
to create subordinate certificate authorities, and to 
revoke a certificate in the rare case that a subordinate 
certificate authority becomes compromised. Consequently, 
the root certificate private key may be archived off-line 
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for essentially the life of the certificate authority, 
thereby protecting it from exposure.
The alternative security practice of maintaining an 
on-line registration authority and a separate off-line 
certificate authority, the method promoted by OpenCA, will 
not be directly supported by MiniCA. This alternative 
method protects the private key of the root certificate 
from exposure by never allowing it to be placed on a 
network accessible computer. Rather, certificate requests 
are copied from an on-line registration authority to 
removable media and carried by hand to the off-line 
certificate authority for signature. Although this 
technique provides the maximum protection for the private 
key against exposure and avoids some certificate 
installation issues caused by nested certificates, it adds 
expense to the deployment of a certificate authority with 
an extra system to maintain and adds tediousness to the 




Encryption is an essential tool used to provide 
confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and non­
repudiation services. These services are provided though 
one-way (hash) functions, symmetric-key encryption, and 
public-key encryption.
2.1 Encryption Tools
One-way functions, symmetric-key encryption, and 
public-key encryption contribute to providing the desired 
services of encryption.
2.1.1 One-way Functions
One-way functions, also called hash functions or 
cryptographic digests, accept arbitrary input data to 
calculate a hash value or a digest. It is relatively easy 
to compute a hash value for a given input, however it is 
"computationally infeasible" to calculate an input value 
from a hash value "for most [hash values]" [7]. That is, 
it is easy to calculate a hash value from input data but it 
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is hard (or impossible) to calculate input data from a hash 
value, figure 2.1.
One-Way Function
Figure 2.1. Analogy for a One-way Function
Data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation 
services all depend on one-way functions that rarely, if 
ever, produce collisions. A collision occurs when two 
distinct input values result in the same hash value when 
passed through a one-way function.
2.1.2 Symmetric-Key Encryption
Symmetric-key encryption, sometimes called shared-key 
encryption, uses one key for both the encryption function 
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which translates plaintext into cyphertext and the 
corresponding decryption function which translates the 
cyphertext back into plaintext, figure 2.2. When compared 
to public-key encryption, symmetric-key cyphers are 
computationally less intensive and therefore can encrypt or 
decrypt more data and at a faster rate [7]. However, 
distribution of symmetric-keys creates infrastructure and 
scalability problems.
Figure 2.2. Symmetric-key Encryption Key Usage
In order for symmetric-key encryption to remain 
secure, the encryption key must remain secret and the key 
must be changed regularly [7]. Keeping symmetric-keys 
secret requires that a secure channel be established to 
allow the distribution of keys. This infrastructure 














Figure 2.3. Confidentiality and Key Exchange 
telephone (if that network is considered secure) or copying 
the key to removable media and delivering the key to the 
receiving party by hand. These methods work when there are 
only a handful of parties participating. However, they 
become tedious as the number of participants grows.
2.1.2.1 Distribution and Scalability
As an example of how symmetric keys are distributed, 
consider three people Alice, Bob, and Candice who 
communicate with each other using symmetric-key encryption 
as proposed by Garfinkel [5]. In order to prevent 
eavesdropping, each pair of participants must generate and 
exchange a secret symmetric key. Alice and Bob communicate 
using the key AB to prevent Candice from snooping, Bob and
10
Candice communicate using the key BC to prevent Alice from 
snooping, and so on to create three keys in total, figure 
2.4(a). Now suppose Daisy wishes to participate. Alice, 
Bob and Candice each now need to generate and exchange a 
symmetric key with Daisy (AD, BD, CD). Adding one more 
person required three more keys, making the total number 
six, figure.2.4(b). When Eric joins four more keys will 
need to be generated and exchanged, making a total of 10 
keys for five people, figure 2.4(c). As a function of n, 
where n is the number of participants, the number of keys 
required is f (n) = (n2-n)/2 . Consequently, key exchange using 
the manual phone/fax or by-hand methods become more 




Public-key encryption, sometimes called asymmetric 
encryption, uses two different but strongly related keys 
for its encryption and decryption functions. One key, the 
private key, is kept secret. The other key, the public 
key, is publicly distributed. Data encrypted with the 
public key can only be decrypted with the private key which 
is useful for general confidentiality protection as well as 
the exchange of symmetric keys, figure 2.3. Conversely, 
data encrypted with the private key can only be decrypted 
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with the public key which is essential in the creation of 
digital signatures, figure 2.5.
Public-key encryption holds an advantage over 
symmetric-key encryption when it comes to key distribution. 
Public keys may be distributed freely and publicly and are 
available for use by parties that may not have any previous 
relationship. They do not need to be exchanged in a secure 
communications channel as. is the case for symmetric-key 
encryption. This feature is what allows banking and e- 
commerce to take place over the Internet today.
When compared to symmetric-key encryption, present day 
public-key cyphers are typically computationally more 
expensive [7]. This limits their practical use to small 
amounts of data, such as exchanging symmetric keys and 
digital signatures.
2.2 Encryption Services
Encryption tools such as one-way functions, symmetric- 
key encryption, and public-key encryption allow for 
encryption-based services such as confidentiality, data 
integrity, non-repudiation, and authentication.
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2.2.1 Confidentiality
Both symmetric-key encryption and public-key 
encryption can protect the confidentiality of information 
while still allowing it to be accessible by authorized 
parties. When a cryptographic function transforms 
plaintext into cyphertext it is "computationally 
infeasible" for even a determined attacker to derive any 
plaintext from the cyphertext without knowledge of the 
appropriate key [7]. Authorized parties possessing the 
proper keys, however, can easily recover the original 
plaintext.
2.2.2 Data Integrity and Digital Signatures
Data integrity services rely on one-way hash functions 
and digital signatures. A digital signature is created by 
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passing data to be signed through a one-way hash function 
and then encrypting the result with the private key of the 
signing entity, figure 2.6.
The signature is later verified by passing the signed 
data through same one-way hash function and comparing the 
result to the value obtained by decrypting the digital 
signature with the signer's public key, figure 2.7. If the 
two values match, it is evident that the signed data was 
not tampered with and that the signing entity participated 
in the signature. Provided that there is a mechanism in 
place to properly authenticate that the public key indeed 
belongs to the signing entity, the digital signature 
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provides a strong method to verify data integrity. Digital 
signatures also provide non-repudiation.
2.2.3 Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation is a subtle but powerful feature of 
public-key encryption based on the difficulty to forge a 
digital signature and the privacy of the private key. 
Provided the private key remains known to only to the 
signer, non-repudiation prevents the signer of a document 
from later repudiating or disowning that signature. That 
is, under public-key encryption, someone can not make a 
signature and later claim with credibility that they did 
not make the signature.
Non-repudiation makes the individual creating a 
digital signature accountable for that signature. 
Consequently, it allows digital signatures to replace 
traditional signatures in business processes and, when 
combined with their difficulty to forge, demonstrates how 
digital signatures can actually be superior to their 
traditional counterparts.
In comparison, symmetric-key encryption does not 
provide non-repudiation. Consider again the scenario 
proposed in section 2.1.2.1. If Bob receives an encrypted 
message from Alice, Alice can claim with credibility that 
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she did not send the message. Since Bob and Alice share 
the same key (AB), it is possible Bob created the message 
himself [9].
2.2.4 Authentication
Using certificates for authentication typically 
involves a trusted third party such as a certificate 
authority. As discussed in section 3.3, one of the roles 
of the certificate authority is to validate identities and 
associate those identities with public keys in the form of 
digital certificates.
To authenticate that public key belongs to the 
identity in the certificate, the signature of the 
certificate must be verified, figure 2.7. The body of the 
certificate (the signed data) is passed through the one-way 
hash function specified in the certificate. The result is 
compared to the value obtained by decrypting the 
certificate's digital signature with the public key of the 
signing, trusted certificate authority. If the two values 
match, the public key can be trusted to belong to the 
identity in the certificate with a high level of assurance.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF A CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY
A certificate authority's primary role is to manage 
certificate signing requests, a process that requires an 
interface to accept incoming certificate signing requests, 
a method, to validate identities, and a procedure for 
signing certificates. Optionally a CA will perform other 
functions, such as revoke certificates and hold private 
keys in escrow. These functions are governed by the 
certificate authority's operating procedures and policies.
3.1 Structure of a Certificate Signing Request
A certificate signing request, or CSR, is a data 
structure standardized by the company RSA Security in 
RFC2986. This structure contains "a distinguished name, a 
public key, and optionally a set of attributes", figure 3.1 







Figure 3.1. Structure of a Certificate Signing Request
The distinguished name typically describes the 
identify a computer resource or person. The distinguished 
name is meant to describe the identity in a globally unique 
way. For example, although there are many people named 
James Macdonell in the world, there should only be one 
James Macdonell working in the Information Security Office 
of CSU San Bernardino in San Bernardino, California, USA.
The public key is the key the requesting entity wishes 





Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Bernardino, 0=California 
State University San Bernardino, OU=People, CN=James 
Macdonell/emailAddress=jmacdone@csusb.edu
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:9c:2b:2a:49:45:24:e2:e5:3d:a9:5b:53:31:79:







... lines deleted .. .
78 : 80
---- BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----
MIIB/zCCAWgCAQAwgb4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlh
... many lines deleted ...
NWDEEnq6q+u3RLavj/POAXU7SytRGJsumKpZBUmGMNvxeIA=
---- END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----
Figure 3.2. Example Certificate Signing Reguest
The remaining optional attributes may be used to 
request vendor or application specific extensions be 
included in the digital certificate. An example optional 
attribute is dNSName, an attribute describing how the 
entity is named in the Doman Naming System (DNS). Another 
example of an optional attribute is the challenge password, 
which is used by some certificate authorities to allow a 
requesting entity to revoke a certificate without direct 
intervention of the certificate authority.
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The distinguished name, the public key, and attributes 
are used by the certificate authority to create an X.509 
public-key certificate, a data structure referred to here 
as a digital certificate.
3.2 Managing Certificate Signing Requests
In order to process certificate signing requests, a 
certificate authority needs to provide an interface to 
allow clients of the CA to submit CSRs along with any other 
verification-related information required by the CA. A 
certificate authority also needs to provide an interface 
for the certificate authority administrator to analyze 
pending certificate signing requests in order to verify the 
authenticity of the request as well as validate the 
identity contained within the request. If the CA 
administrator is able to validate that the newly requested 
identity belongs to the requesting entity, the 
administrator may proceed to sign the request. Otherwise, 
the administrator may reject the request.
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3.3 Validating Identities
Digital certificates are used as evidence of an 
entity's identity and can be used for authentication, 
authorization and non-repudiation. As the sensitivity and 
importance of resources protected by digital certificates 
rise, so does the need to ensure that a certificate belongs 
to the proper entity.
It is desirable for a trustworthy certificate 
authority to perform checks as part of its procedures to 
ensure that the identities on certificates it signs are 
valid. In order for an identity to be valid, it must be 
unique and it must belong to the entity who requested the 
certificate. Failure to verify the identities of all 
certificates signed by a CA could compromise the 
trustworthiness of the CA. For example, in 2001 VeriSign 
issued a certificate used for code signing with the 
identity "Microsoft Corporation" to a malicious 
organization that had nothing to do with Microsoft. This 
created a security threat. The malicious organization 
could have release malicious code which appeared to have 
been written and released by Microsoft. If mistakes such 
as this continue, VeriSign would no longer be trusted as 
certificate authority. As a result the prompt for running 
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new software stating "Publisher authenticity verified by 
VeriSign Commercial Software Publishers CA" becomes 
meaningless.
Certificates may be verified with varying levels of 
assurance. Although there is no formal standard, the term 
"low assurance" commonly describes certificates containing 
identities that were verified through a simple process such 
as a password check or email assess verification. The term 
"high assurance" describes certificates with identities 
verified through a vetting procedure which required viewing 
government certificates, such as driver's license, 
passport, or require the CA administrator to have personal 
knowledge of the requesting entity.
3.3.1 Structure of a Certificate
An Internet X.509 public-key certificate, commonly 
known as a digital certificate, is a data structure 
standardized in RFC2459 [3]. This structure contains 
several components: the subject's distinguished name, or 
DN, the issuer's DN, the subject's public key, a serial 
number, a notValidBefore date, a notValidAfter date, an 
optional set of extensions, and a digital signature, figure 
3.3. An example of a digital certificate can be seen in 
figure 3.4. The subject names the identity of the
23
Digital Certificate
Figure 3.3. Structure of a Digital Certificate
certificate which is being associated with the public key. 
The issuer names the certificate authority that signed the 
certificate. This DN is used when verifying the signature. 
The issuer DN as well as the serial number are used when 
checking the certificate's validity against a certificate 
revocation list. The two dates define the lifetime of the 
certificate. The extensions contain additional data useful 
for authentication and authorization schemes. Finally, the 
24
digital signature is used as proof that certificate was 





Serial Number: 2 (0x2)
Signature Algorithm: shalWithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=CSU San Bernardino Common Identity CA 
Validity
Not Before: Jan 6 19:08:28 2006 GMT
Not After : Jan 6 19:08:28 2008 GMT
Subject: CN=James Macdonell/emailAddress=jmacdone@csusb.edu 
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:9c:2b:2a:49:45:24:e2:e5:3d:a9:5b:53:31:79:





X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
Netscape Comment:
"Generated by CSU San Bernardino with OpenSSL" 
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
97:13:73:ED:B0:6C:52:A0:88:66:IC:E8:D3:2F:94:...




Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment 









... many lines deleted ...
2+vKmlV5LwnrifGUs2l=
---- END CERTIFICATE----
Figure 3.4. Example Digital Certificate
26
The core components of the digital certificate are the 
subject DN, the public key and the digital signature. The 
digital signature binds the subject identity to the public 
key, creating an official document of the issuing 
certificate authority. If an entity using the certificate 
trusts the issuing certificate authority, it will also 
trust that the public key indeed belongs to the identity 
specified in the subject.
3.3.2 Creating- Certificates
To create a digital certificate, a certificate 
authority extracts the requested identity and public key 
from a certificate signing request and places them into the 
subject and public key components of a new digital 
certificate, figure 3.5. The identity may be optionally 
updated or corrected by the CA administrator before being 
placed into the digital certificate. The identity of the 
certificate authority is placed in the issuer component.
The notValidBefore component is set to the current date and 
time, and the notValidAfter component is set to a date 
typically 365 to 720 days in the future. Next, a set of 
extension values are optionally added to the data 
structure. Finally, a unique serial number is selected for 
the certificate and added to the data structure.
27
Figure 3.5. Creating a Digital Certificate
To create the signature, as described in section 2.2.2 
(Page 14), the binary data representing the currently 
defined components of the certificate are passed through a 
one-way hash function. This value is encrypted using the 
private key of the certificate authority. The result is 
added to the data structure as the digital signature, 




MiniCA is intended to be used as a tool to promote the 
use of digital certificates by providing a user-friendly 
interface for automating some of the more tedious functions 
of a certificate authority.
4.1 Managing Certificate Signing Requests with
MiniCA
For small scale deployments, certificate signing 
requests are submitted to the CA as an email attachment. 
The CA administrator would then examine the identity 
contained within the CSR with a tool such as OpenSSL's req 
tool and would then validate the identity. Should the 
request meet the requirements of the CA, the CA 
administrator would proceed to sign the request.
Otherwise, the request would be rejected by either replying 
to the email or by making a phone call. Although an email 
interface such as this requires almost no new 
infrastructure to implement, it contains a fair amount of 
manual tasks to be performed by the CA administrator. Also, 
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it lacks desirable features such as automatically 
maintaining a history of certificate signing requests and 
signed certificates.
There is 1 request pending for jinacdone
1. 2006-03-01 - jmacdone - [ delete ] CN=workhorse.infosec.csusb.edu/OU=Informatioh Security 
Office/O=Caiifornia State University San Bernardino
HfgSSW®--------------------- 5---------------------------------- —■■■--------- "—
You may submit your CSR one of two ways...
Figure 4.1. MiniCA Certificate Signing Request Submission 
Interface
The MiniCA interface allows the submission of 
certificate signing requests through a web-based interface. 
After authenticating, the requesting entity is presented 
30
with a web form that allows the requester the option to 
either select the file containing the CSR to be uploaded to 
the CA or to paste PEM formatted request text to the form, 
figure 4.1. After submission, CSR is stored in a database 
and the requester is presented with a screen showing the 
status of the request. If the request is accepted, in 
addition to seeing the status in the interface, the 
requesting entity is sent an email to verify that the CA 
received the request and that it is now pending signature. 
The CA administrator is also sent an email notification 
that a new certificate signing request is pending 
signature.
An authenticated requesting entity is given the option 
to cancel an erroneous request. The creation and 
submission of certificate signing requests is an infrequent 
task for most clients of a certificate authority. Giving 
the client the option to cancel the request allows him or 
her to remove erroneous requests from the certificate 
authority without involving the CA administrator. This 
should ease the burden on the CA administrator while 
providing an interactive and error-tolerant environment for 
the client.
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The MiniCA interface performs checks to automate other 
tasks of the CA administrator. Besides ensuring that 
clients only submit properly formatted CSRs to the CA, the 
interface collects attributes of the identity (the username 
and email address) used to authenticate the requesting 
entity. This data is useful in verifying the identity 
contained within the CSR.
4.2 Validating Identities with MiniCA
The MiniCA interface for the CA administrator lists 
the details of pending certificates, namely the 
authentication information of the requester and the 
requested identity. It is then up to the CA administrator 
to manually validate the identity through its established 
vetting procedures.
For each pending request, the CA administrator is 
given the option to reject the request or proceed to either 
sign the request as is or to sign the request after 
modifications. Giving the CA administrator the option to 
modify a request before signing it is a somewhat unique 
feature of MiniCA. It is considered by some a best 
practice for the CA to only sign requests that contain 
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error-free identities conforming to all the standards and 
policies of the CA. In practice, this typically results in 
situations where a requesting entity will need to submit 
several CSRs and the CA administrator will need to reject 
several CSRs because of typographical errors, misspellings, 
and inconsistent naming. For example, the stateOrProvince 
component of a distinguished name needs to be spelled out 
(e.g "California") in order to comply with the ITU-T X.501 
standard. However, it is all too common for requesting 
entities to abbreviate the value (e.g "CA" or "Calif."). 
If the CA administrator has an option to modify the 
request, that individual can simply correct the 
stateOrProvince information. Otherwise, the CA 
administrator is forced to reject the CSR, compelling the 
requesting entity to submit another CSR with the minor 
correction. This adds time, tediousness, and complexity to 
the role of requesting entity which may discourage them 
from utilizing the certificate authority.
Regardless of whether the CSR is signed or rejected, 
the requesting entity is sent an email updating them on the 
status of their request.
Running a local certificate authority, as MiniCA is 
intended to be run, holds an advantage in the validation 
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process. The validation is inherently more meaningful 
because the local certificate authority is closer to the 
knowledge necessary to properly validate an identity as 
compared to a global certificate authority, such as 
VeriSign™ or GeoTrust™. Trust of the local certificate 
authority is also more explicit. Entities using 
certificates signed by the local certificate authority must 
take an active role and choose to install and trust the 
root certificate of the local certificate authority. This 
has an advantage of improved security in that it raises 
awareness of the usage and purpose of digital certificates. 
Conversely, the explicit trust creates some disadvantage. 
Clients need extra configuration, and corrective measures 
may be unclear for clients receiving errors while using 
digital certificates signed under a local certificate 
authority for the first time.
4.3 Creating Certificates with MiniCA
Once a requesting entity submits a certificate signing 
request and the identity of the requested certificate is 
verified, the CA administrator may proceed with signing the 
certificate. From the MiniCA interface, figure 4.2, a CA
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There is 1 request pending.
F workhorse.infosec.csusb.edu requested by jmacd'one < jmacdone@csusb.edu >
.Subject
C Use requested subject DN
F Override requested Subject: DN
cn: workhorse.infosec.csusb.edu
Information Security Office











Servers/Clients CAs /Clients ii Servers q CAs
FnonRepudiation 












| CN=CSU San Bernardino SSL CA/OU=lnformation Security Office/Q=California State University San Bernardino F|] 
Passphrase: | j/sign Selected |
Rejection Options 
jf Reject Selected [
Figure 4.2. MiniCA Certificate Signing Interface 
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administrator selects one or more certificate signing 
requests to be signed, optionally modifies what will become 
the subject of their respective certificates, selects a 
root or subsidiary certificate to sign the certificates 
under, enters the appropriate passphrase for the private 
key of that certificate and selects the "Sign" button.
From: CSU San Bernardino CA <ca@infosec.csusb.edu>
To: James Macdonell <jmacdone@csusb.edu>
Cc: CSU San Bernardino CA <ca@infosec.csusb.edu>
Subject: Certificate request signed
James Macdonell,
Your certificate has been signed by the CSU San Bernardino CA
CN=James Macdonell/OU=People/0=CSU San Bernardino 
https://ca.infosec.csusb.edu/minica/cgi-bin/view-
cert.pl?issuer=78;serial=0x2
If you have questions regarding the status of the request please 
contact CSU San Bernardino CA <ca@infosec.csusb.edu>
Figure 4.3. Example Email Notification
If the signature finishes successfully, the new 
certificate is added to the database and the requester is 
sent an email notification containing a link back to the 
MiniCA where the client may retrieve the signed 
certificate, figure 4.3. If an error occurs (e.g. the CA 
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administrator provided an incorrect passphrase for the 
private key of the signing certificate), the database is 
left unmodified and the MiniCA interface then presents the 
CA administrator with an error code.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MINICA SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Purpose
MiniCA will provide a software interface to automate 
and enforce the technical and business processes related to 
a Certificate Authority, namely the signing of Digital 
Certificates.
To provide a clear and concise "Software Requirement 
Specification" for the MiniCA software project, this 
document will: (1) define the set of desired functionality 
for the software product, (2) provide a basis for 
validation and verification of the software product, and
(3) serve as a basis for enhancement.
The audience for whom the software project is intended 
includes:
Technical staff requiring Certificates for use in SSL 




MiniCA is intended to be used at small to medium sized 
institutions with modest resources for supporting a 
Certificate Authority. Its functionality will focus 
strongly towards providing certificates to administrators 
of common public-key encryption technologies, such as 
secure web sites. As such, MiniCA will provide a 
convenient interface for web masters and system 
administrators to submit requests for digital certificates 
in the form of Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs). In 
compliment, MiniCA will also provide a convenient interface 
for Certificate Authority administrators to manage the 
signing (issuing), revoking and renewing of digital 
certificates.
An interface to allow people to request and renew 
digital certificates identifying themselves, so called 
client certificates, is intended to be implemented not in 
this iteration, but in future development iterations. 
However, architecture of the software and data stores will 
be developed■with this feature in mind.
39
5.1.3 Definitions, Acronyms, and Abbreviations
CA or Certificate Authority
All of the systems, policies, procedures and personnel 
used for the signing and administration of digital 
certificates. A Certificate Authority provides the 
basis for the PKI trust model. Certificate Authorities 
typically take the role of a "trusted third-party" that 
issues and verifies identities at varying levels of 
assurance.
Certificate Chain
A list of digital certificates linked by digital 
signatures. Certificate chains are used to establish the 
relation ship between a certificate, Intermediate 
Certificate Authorities and a trusted Certificate 
Authority.
Certificate Signing Request or CSR
A CSR is a standardized data object containing 1) a 
distinguished name and 2) a public key. A CSR is 
typically submitted to a Certificate Authority, which, 
pursuant to its policies and procedures, will sign the 
request thereby creating a digital certificate.
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Cryptographic Key
Required data given as a parameter to a encryption (or 
decryption) algorithm when translating plain-text to 
cipher-text (or vise-versa). The level of privacy 
protection for a given cipher-text is often directly 
related to the strength of the cryptographic key.
Digital Certificate
A Digital Certificate is a standardized data object 
containing 1) a distinguished name 2) a public key and 
3) a cryptographic signature. The cryptographic 
signature binds the public key to the identity. Any 
entity possessing the private key corresponding to the 
public key of the certificate can be trusted to be the 
identity specified by the distinguished name with a 
level of assurance derived from the trust relationship 
with the signing Certificate Authority.
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Digital Signature, Cryptographic Signature
The digital signature is used as a means of 
authenticating a designated piece of information based 
on both the information and the private key of the 
signing entity. A signer typically creates a digital 
signature passing by the designated information through 
a cryptographic digest (one-way hash) function and 
encrypting the result of the digest with a signer's 
private key. The digital signature can then be later 
verified by passing the designated information to the 
same cryptographic digest function and comparing the 
result to the digital signature decrypted using the 
signer's public key.
HTTP
HyperText Transfer Protocol -- the standard protocol for 




An attack against a encrypted network connection such as 
an SSL/TLS connection that allows an attacker to 




MySQL is the most popular Open Source SQL database 
management system.
Nested Certificates
Certificates belonging to a Certificate Chain.
OpensSL
A suite of libraries and executables for SSL. Available: 
http://www.openssl.orq
Perl
Perl is an acronym for "Practical Extraction and Report 
Language" It is an interpreted language that is 
optimized for string manipulation, I/O, and system 
tasks. It is popular for use in CGI programs.
Personally Identifiable Information
Information can can be used to uniquely identify an 
individual, such as combinations of name, date of birth, 
and social security number. Should personally 
identifiable information be accessed by an unauthorized 
party, under California law all individuals listed in 
the compromised data store must be notified of the 




A social engineering technique, typically involving
' impersonation of a trusted identity in an effort to 
obtain sensitive information such as passwords and bank 
account numbers
PKI
A public-key infrastructure (PKI) consists of protocols, 
services, and standards supporting applications of 
public-key cryptography, such as SSL.
Public-Key Encryption
A set of algorithms and data handling procedures for 
creating and utilizing public and private keys to 
encrypt data. For any valid key pair, anything encrypted 
with the public key can only be decrypted using the 
corresponding private key. Anything encrypted with 
private key can only be decrypted with the public key. 
Public keys are freely distributed; private keys are 
kept as private as possible.
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RA or Registration Authority
A Registration Authority is a typical component of a 
Certificate Authority. A Registration Authority performs 
certain tasks delegated by Certificate Authority, such 
as preparing Certificate Signing Requests by performing 
evidence of identity checks, to help minimize the 
exposure of the Certificate Authority.
SSL /TLS
Secure Socket Layer -- The SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)
Handshake Protocol was developed by Netscape
Communications Corporation to provide security and 
privacy over the Internet. The SSL protocol maintains 
the security and integrity of the transmission channel 
by using encryption, authentication and message 
authentication codes. SSL was renamed to TLS (Transport 
Layer Security) after SSL version 3.
Trusted Certificates
A Certificate is considered "Trusted" if 1) it has been 
added by a user or application developer to an SSL 
application's trusted certificate database or 2) its 
Certificate Chain contains a trusted Certificate.
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Two-factor Authentication
A procedure for verifying an identity in two independent 
ways. Common factors include: "something you know" - a 
password, "something you have" - a certificate or token, 
and "something you are" - a thumbprint or other 
biometric.
Valid. Digital Certificate
A Certificate is considered "Valid" if 1) Its period of 
validity has begun and has not expired 2) It is part of 
a Certificate Chain that contains a trusted Certificate. 
3) It has not been revoked
5.1.4 References
Please see page 67.
5.1.5 Overview
The remainder of this document defines the functions 
and specific requirements of MiniCA in a format consistent 





This section will list the software's system 
interfaces and identify the software functionality 
necessary to create the interfaces.
5.2.1.2 User Interfaces
Users will interact with the software through a CGI 
generated interface accessed via a web browser.
5.2.1.2.1 Home Page
The home page will offer links to the features common 
to all roles.
5.2.1.2.2 Authentication Interface
These pages will prompt the user for credentials for 
functions requiring authentication to authorize use.
5.2.1.2.3 Submit Certificate Signing Request
Interface
These pages will provide the interface for submitting 
certificate signing requests to the Certificate Authority.
5.2.1.2.4 View Certificates Interface
These pages will dynamically list and individually 
display the certificates signed under the Certificate 
Authority.
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5.2.1.2.5 Revoked Certificate Interface
These pages will display a dynamically generated list 
of Certificates revoked by the Certificate Authority.
5.2.1.2.6 Documentation Interface
These page will provide access to the on-line user 
documentation, such as a user's guide, FAQ, etc.
5.2.1.2.7 Certificate Signing Interface
These pages will allow the administrator role to sign 
or reject pending certificate signing requests.
5.2.1.2.8 Certificate Maintenance Interface
These pages will allow the administrator to add 
previously signed certificates to the on-line certificate 
store, add or remove the private key associated with a 
certificate, or revoke a certificate.
5.2.1.2.9 System Configuration Interface
■ These pages will allow the administrator to configure 
options such as LDAP authentication and SMTP notification.
5.2.1.3 Hardware Interfaces
The software will rely on the host operating system 




The software will require an SSL-enabled web server, 
and SQL database system, and Perl 5.8 or greater with the 
CGI and DBI (DataBase Interface) packages installed and a 
DBD (DataBase Driver) package appropriate for the SQL 
database system. Perl LDAP packages will need to be 
installed for authentication. The software will be 
developed with Apache 2.x compiles with mod_ssl, and MySQL 
3.x as the SQL database system.
The web server will deliver the Perl CGI generated 
user interfaces to the user's web browser. The SQL database 
system and related Perl packages will be used to track and 
archive pending, valid, and revoked Certificates. The web 
browser will also be used to provide authentication and 
authorization when necessary.
An SSL-enabled web browser will be required to utilize 
the User Interface.
5.2.1.5 Memory Constrains
The software- will need to run on a single contemporary 
of-the-self computer and will function with a minimum of 
256MB of RAM and 20GB of secondary storage.
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5.2.1.6 Operations
Backup and recovery operations will be delegated to 
the Systems Administrator of the host operating system.
5.2.1.7 Site Adaptation Requirements
An LDAP server needs to be populated with uid, 
password, and email address to allow for fully functional 
authentication and SMTP notification interfaces. Some sites 
may need to generate a temporary self-signed certificate to 
configure the web server for SSL, as a bootstrapping 
measure, should no existing PKI exist.
5.2.1.8 Communications Interfaces
The software will rely upon the Software Interfaces to 





Users under this role will have access to lists of 
Certificates as well as the Documentation provided for the 
PKI. Example users include the clients of SSL enabled web 
sites.
5.2.3.2 Service Provider
Users under this role will have access to features 
provided to the Service User role. In addition, they will 
have the ability to Submit Certificate Signing Requests and 
request the status of those requests. Example users include 
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the system administrators of SSL enabled web sites. Users 
under this role must authenticate to access the Submit CSR 
and Request Status features.
5.2.3.3 Administrator
Users under this role will have access to features 
provided to the Server Provider role. In addition, they 
will have the ability to Sign Certificate Signing Requests 
and Maintain the status of Certificates in the database. 
Users under this role must authenticate to access the 
Certificate Signing and Certificate Maintenance features.
5.2.4 Constraints
5.2.4.1 RFC 2459
The software should provide functionality to implement 
the policies suggested in this standards document. Key 
examples include the ability to create a chain of 
Certificate Authorities and the ability to assign 
appropriate x509v3 extensions to signed certificates such 
as 'cA:TRUE' to certificates to be used by Certificate 
Authorities.
5.2.4.2 Higher Education PKI-Lite
This document priorities the implementation of 
policies suggested in RFC 2459 for Higher Education 
institutions.
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5.2.4.3 Assumptions and Dependencies
5.2.4.4 Root Certificates
Before any other certificates can be signed, a self­
signed Root Certificate with its corresponding private key 
must first be added to the Certificate Authority via the 
Certificate Maintenance feature. Although the CA will not 
provide this functionality in this version, documentation 
on how to create a Root Certificate using the command line 
features of OpenSSL should be referenced.
5.2.4.5 LDAP
A pre-populated LDAP directory will be required in 
order to authenticate distinguish users with access to the 





A set of HTML pages describing the steps necessary to 
utilize the functionality of the CA. Topics for 
documentation include: creating a CSR, submitting a CSR, 
checking the status of a CSR, installing a signed
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Certificates signed by: CSU San Bernardino SSL CA
Choose View to view the details of each certificate.
Subjects marked with line-through have been revoked.
View 03 blackboard.csusb.edu , Data Center
Expires in 339 days
View 02 ncvpn.csusb.edu , Telecommunications and Network Services
Expires in 324 days
Viewjoi ncvpn. csusb.adu , Tolocommunications and-Notwork-Sefviccs
Expires in 318 days
j View) 00 ca.infosec.csusb.edu , Information Security Office 
Expires in 318 days
Figure 5.2. View Certificates Interface (1 of 2)
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View Certificates
• CSU San Bernardino Root CA
o CSU San Bernardio Intermediary CA
■ CSU San Bernardino SSL CA




■ CSU San Bernardino Common Identity CA




C = US, ST = California, L = San Bernardino, O = California State University San Bernardino, 
OU = Information Security Office, CN = ca.infosec.csusb.edu, emailAddress = 
admin@infosec.csusb.edu
Issuer
C = US, ST = California, L = San Bernardino, 0 = California State University San Bernardino, 




• Not Valid Before: 200S-06-21 GMT
• Not Valid After: 2006-06-21 GMT
• Expires in: 318 days
• CA: FALSE
• Processed by: James Macdonell
PEM formatted certificate
---- BEGIN CERTIFICATE----  
HIIEsjCCBBugAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG. . .
...more data...




Figure 5.4. View Certificate Details Interface
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5.3.1.1.3 Submit Certificate Signing Request
Submit CSR





Figure 5.5. Authentication Interface
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Submit a CSR■
You have one request pending:
1. cn=photos.csusb.edu,ou=ACM,o=CSU San Bernardino (Cancel)
You may submit your PEM formatted certificate request one of two ways,,.
Upload the request file





CN = newservice.infosec.csusb.edu, OU = Information Security Office, O = California State University San 
Bernardino, L = San Bernardino, ST = California, C = US
Requested 2004-11-16 23:47:39 GMT byjmacdone
- Signing Options---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Select Signing CA: I CSU San Bernardino SSL CA pjl
Passphrase: | I
Valid for: |365 ] days
CN = |newservice.csusb.edu |
OU = [information Security Office .[
O = [California State University San Bernardino |
L = San Bernardino
Create Certificate Abort




The system shall provide an interface to list the 
status of all certificates signed by the CA. It also shall 
allow the details of individual certificates to be 
displayed and allow individual certificates to be retrieved 













I I II I___  I • I________________________ I
___ I I IT 1 II I I
Figure 5.8. View Certificates Sequence Diagram
60
5.3.2.2 Submit Certificate Signing Request
I Client Browser | | Submit CSR | | DBI | Net::SMTP
Submit()
i























Gt-1 i i rIlli
Figure 5.9. Submit Certificate Signing Request Sequence
Diagram
The system shall allow the Service Provider role, 
after authentication, to submit PEM formatted Certificate 
Signing Requests via a CGI form submission. Improperly 
formatted submissions will result in an error.
5.3.2.3 Request Status
The system shall provide an interface to allow the 
Service Provider role, after authentication, to view the 
status of their CSR submissions.
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I Client Browser ] | Request Status ]









The system shall provide interface to allow the
Administrator role, after authentication, to sign or reject
Certificate Signing Requests.
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i ii ii ii ii ii i
Figure 5.11. Certificate Signing Sequence Diagram
5.3.2.5 Maintain Certificates
The system shall provide an interface to allow the
Administrator role, after authentication, to add existing 
certificates to the Certificate Authority as well as store 
and remove the private keys for individual certificates.
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Figure 5.12. Certificate Maintenance Sequence Diagram
5.3.3 Performance Requirements
5.3.3.1 External Interfaces
Users should be notified if an interactive function 
may take longer than 7 seconds to respond.
5.3.4 Logical Database Requirements
The system will require an SQL Database System and a 
driver compatible with the Perl DBI package such as 
DBD::mysql.
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"This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509
v2 CRL for use in the Internet."
5.3.5.1.1.1 X.509 v3 Certificates
Certificate Authorities should produce and handle 
X.509 v3 certificates. An inventory of the standard fields, 
standard extensions, and their usage is provided
5.3.5.1.1.2 X.509 CRL v2
"CA [should] periodically [issue] a signed data 
structure called a certificate revocation list (CRL)"
65
5.3.5.1.1.3 Certification Authority
"Provision is needed for a variety of different means 
of certificate and CRL delivery, including distribution 
procedures based on LDAP, HTTP, FTP, and X.500."
Certificate Authorities need to support a standard set 
of algorithms used in public-key cryptography.
5.3.5.1.2 Higher Education PKI-Lite
This document is intends to provide a standard for 
higher education institutions for implementing a public-key 
infrastructure.
"HE-PKI-Lite is the deployment of PKI technology using 
existing standard campus mechanisms for identifying 
individuals affiliated with the institution and for 
securing systems."
• "HE-PKI-Lite Certification Authorities (CAs) are not 
required to be able to revoke certificates."
• "Operators... must understand the significance of the 
CA's private key(s) and take action to protect the 
key(s) appropriately."
• PKI-Lite certificates may be used for digital
signatures and key encipherment.
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